Enrique Baca
This study sets out to establish a general framework for a good understanding of the phenomenon of social hate and its materialisation in the form of so-called ‘hate crimes’.
To do so, we have used an aphoristic format to focus the definitions in operational terms and so take a very precise approach to the mechanisms that underlie the processes, avoiding a literary discourse.
As a prelude, here are some basic definitions (which involve linguistic memory) and some brief considerations on the conceptualisation processes involved.
They are:
In Spanish the term ‘odio’ (from the Latin odium: aversion, horror, displeasure, repugnance) has an equivalent, possibly even more common in everyday language: abhorrescere (from the Latin abhosrrecere: fear, revulsion or repugnance of something, which makes us distance ourselves from it).
The Dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language (DRAE) defines hate as dislike of, or aversion to, someone, and a wish that something bad should happen to them. This introduces an element that should be taken into account: it is more than mere repugnance or rejection, it incorporates an attitude (which might be no more than a simple desire, never turned into action) to “wish (cause) something bad” on the hated person. This explicit meaning is not found in terms to define hate in other European languages.
The distinctive note of the Spanish term odio is the wishing of something bad (or harm) on the hated party. Hate can therefore work on feelings or behaviour (potential or exercised).
Human knowledge (which should be differentiated from opinions and beliefs) is based on the following elements:
a) Explanation as a rational way of apprehending a reality; an explanation seeks to create causal relations between two events or circumstances.
b) Understanding as a way of looking at reality through experience: understanding seeks meaningful relations between two events or circumstances.
c) Justification, as a moral way of approaching a situation. Justification seeks to classify a reality as “good” or “bad” and, therefore, make it morally acceptable or rejectable.
d) Legalisation as a way of making a situation legal. The Law always represents something mandatory in its field of application.
The perception that “the right not to be offended does not exist” is also a fallacy, making an unlimited defence of freedom of expression to insult, offend and threaten, which can clearly lead to harassment, humiliation and other attacks on human dignity. This is highlighted in sentences such as the one by the Spanish Constitutional Court on 22.7.2015: “Freedom of expression is not, in short, an absolute fundamental and unlimited right, like all others it logically has its limits, in such a way that any expression, for the simple fact of existing, does not deserve constitutional protection, given that Article. 20.1 a) CE “does not recognise a so-called right to insult” (SSTC 29/2009; 77/2009 and 50/2010).
Freedom of expression cannot offer coverage to hate speech and hate crime. Neither phobias nor the practice of intolerance can violate rights. There is no room for racism, ideological hate, xenophobia, religious intolerance, homophobia, misogyny, ethnocentrism or aggressive nationalism …nor hate based on intolerance of different people or amenability to criminal intolerance.
The legislation of a situation encourages its acceptance by society
Explanation, understanding and legalisation are cognitive/rational moments in this process.
Justification and legitimisation are moral points in the process.
However, we should bear in mind that:
The legislation of a situation encourages its acceptance by society
Explanation, understanding and legalisation are cognitive/rational moments in this process.
Justification and legitimisation are moral points in the process.
However, we should bear in mind that:
a) Explaining and understanding a situation does not imply justification. Knowing the causal mechanisms and/or experiential mechanisms (affective and cognitive) that sustain an event do not imply that it can be automatically considered morally positive (or negative).
b) The legalisation of a situation encourages its acceptance by society. The law exerts a strong de facto influence on the consideration of matters subject to it. However, this does not include its transgression in any form.
c) Legalisation does not imply legitimacy.
Legitimacy is an act of moral attribution at an individual level, which can be extended to society in general. However, this moral attribution does not necessarily coincide with positive law (legality). Therefore, the law can be challenged by individuals or groups alleging moral reasons, regardless of its coercive effectiveness.
d) Therefore, the legitimacy of a reality lies in its justification and represents its moral acceptance.
We consider these considerations relevant when making a rational approach to aspects such as freedom of expression, hate speech, construction of the enemy, or even the phenomenon of terrorism.
These will all be addressed below.
Hate as an interpersonal dynamic and hate as a social phenomenon
a) Hate as an interpersonal dynamic
Hate aroused in individuals is a form of negative interpersonal relation (regardless of the moral description we give it).
It can be described as negative in the sense that it does not foster communication, but rather tends to prevent it.
Therefore, we call “personal hate” something that is aroused in a person towards another specific person.
Personal hate, therefore, is a feeling (that can potentially be turned into a behaviour) aimed at a specific person and identified by the hating party. Personal hate is never anonymous.
In the genesis of personal hate, we can identify a series of causal factors to explain the dynamic of the party that hates and make it understandable. In other words, there is always something in the personal life of the person who hates.
Personal hate is very rarely a social construct.
In this study, we do not examine the genesis and dynamics of personal hate.
b) Hate as a social phenomenon
We say “social hate” to refer to the attitudes and behaviours that reject and desire (or bring about) harm to people in the sense that they are part of specifically defined groups.
Although social hate is aimed at groups, it is directed at individuals in these groups, regardless of their personality, life and behaviour.
The effects of social hate, therefore, are perpetrated on people who are part of a group.
Social hate is not, as we have said, based on specific facts or events concerning the individuals who hate, nor of the individuals who are hated. It is based on an overall image of the hated group, one that is constructed socially.
Social hate is always produced by mechanisms and processes of social construction.
Many circumstances lead to the heart of social hate (which is also the origin of its construction process). History teaches us that social hate, already constructed, can originate from a tradition often linked to religious beliefs, political literature by one or several authors who think along similar lines, and the agitation and propaganda of certain ideologies.
The detailed and monographic study (descriptive, explanatory and understandable) of the origins of the main social hate patterns of our time is something that needs further study. Examples such as Salafist polarisation, anti-Roma racism, the rejection of immigrants or certain nationalisms are fields that require differential study. They are not the only ones, however.
One needs to be clear that the mechanisms of personal hate and social hate cannot be studied seriously if they are not identified and studied specifically. Quite often, the hurry to establish general mechanisms means that a solid base is lost in the haste to find more superficial approaches.
This means that when a process of construction, propagation and dissemination of attitudes of hate is detected, we should narrow it down and study it in terms of its own particular features.
Social hate is also the end result of another prior process: the construction of the enemy.
The social forms of the materialisation of hate: The construction of the enemy.
a) The construction of the enemy
The distinction between enemy and adversary (hostis and inimicus) is a classic one. An enemy is distinguished from an adversary by two clear features: a) the persistence (or not) of open communication channels and b) the ultimate aim of the confrontation.
Personal hate is never anonymous
The distinction between enemy and adversary (hostis and inimicus) is a classic one. An enemy is distinguished from an adversary by two clear features: a) the persistence (or not) of open communication channels and b) the ultimate aim of the confrontation.
Personal hate is never anonymous
With an adversary, the possibility of communication exists, and the ultimate aim of the confrontation is to beat (or convince) the other, but not destroy them. With the enemy, there is no chance of communicating with him/her/it and the ultimate aim of the confrontation is, not only victory, but destruction of the enemy.
In social terms, there are no ‘natural’ enemies. All enemies are constructs, and they become real for precisely that reason.
The construction of the enemy process is complex and represents a gradual and deliberate ‘dehumanisation’ of the ‘other’, in such a way that he/she/it ends up dispossessed of any human feature or characteristic.
In this sense, the process of construction of the enemy is a planned and deliberate way of removing the other’s human qualities, reducing and converting it indifferently to groups labelled as enemies, people who, paradoxically, are considered inferior, bestial, dangerous and aggressive at the same time.
This leads to another paradoxical feature of the construction of the enemy. It is always done from a stance of victimism, justifying the dehumanisation of the other by their status as an aggressor -potential or real- of ‘my people’. That is why the constructed enemy is always considered an imminent danger, and any destructive action against it is considered legitimate self-defence.
With an adversary, the possibility of communication exists, and the ultimate aim of the confrontation is to beat (or convince) the other, but not destroy them. With the enemy, there is no chance of communicating with him/her/it and the ultimate aim of the confrontation is, not only victory, but destruction of the enemy.
In social terms, there are no ‘natural’ enemies. All enemies are constructs, and they become real for precisely that reason.
The construction of the enemy process is complex and represents a gradual and deliberate ‘dehumanisation’ of the ‘other’, in such a way that he/she/it ends up dispossessed of any human feature or characteristic.
In this sense, the process of construction of the enemy is a planned and deliberate way of removing the other’s human qualities, reducing and converting it indifferently to groups labelled as enemies, people who, paradoxically, are considered inferior, bestial, dangerous and aggressive at the same time.
This leads to another paradoxical feature of the construction of the enemy. It is always done from a stance of victimism, justifying the dehumanisation of the other by their status as an aggressor -potential or real- of ‘my people’. That is why the constructed enemy is always considered an imminent danger, and any destructive action against it is considered legitimate self-defence.
We would highlight this point: anyone who practices social hate against a particular group because an enemy has been constructed considers themselves, in a way, a victim of that group.
The construction of the enemy is essentially a linguistic process. Language is a determining factor in the construction of the enemy (as in the construction of the ally).
Therefore, one constant characteristic of the construction of the enemy is the use of pejorative and degrading language (cockroaches, yellow monkeys, white devils, sub-human, stupid beasts, inferior race, degenerate peoples, dogs, etc).
The first battle that the ‘constructors of the enemy’ try to win (and generally do) is the battle of language.
The usual forms of the construction of the enemy end up, and take shape, in two well-known historical phenomena: a) war; b) political violence.
Although social hate is aimed at groups, it is exercised on individuals in those groups, regardless of their personality, life or behaviour
In war, the enemy is explicitly specified, and its destruction is raised to the level of an essential requirement for both sides. Furthermore, a total lack of communication with the enemy is considered a mandatory requirement for war, and any infringements are severely punished.
Outside the situation of ‘normalised’ war, the materialisation of the consequences of the construction of the enemy is clearly seen in political violence.
b) Political violence
We understand political violence (and, one step further, revolutionary violence) to be violence that presumably emerges from a desire to change a system perceived as oppressive (or alienating), in which any prospect of communication between those who wish to change it and those who intend to conserve it is considered inviable by the former.
Political violence always emerges from the construction of the enemy. This means that, for political violence to be viable it needs to be preceded by a patient (sometimes very slow) and, above all, effective social construction social of the enemy.
The political enemy (not the adversary) is always a target to be destroyed, and any communication with it is not only sterile but basically damaging and constitutes a betrayal. Terrorism is an extreme form of political violence.
Two kinds of political violence come together in terrorism which are quite close to each other, although distinguishable: a) one that seeks to change the system that is being attacked and b) operational forms of non-conventional war that, although they ultimately target the same thing, focus their immediate activity on harming the designated enemy, regardless of the transforming effectiveness of that harm.
c) Hate speech/narratives
One of the most efficient ways to construct the enemy, which then supports political violence, is by generating a discourse or narratives of hatred (hate speech).
The creation of hate speech is mostly based on the fundamentalism of the proponent. Hate speech can be highly effective in winning people over for the cause of whoever creates and disseminates it.
Hate speech springs from two converging circumstances:
a) a closed view of the world, b) ‘victim playing’, directly and suitably manipulated.
Two basic conditions are therefore required for social hate to develop: a) unquestioning allegiance that develops a clear sense of belonging (more emotional than cognitive, although actually they are combined), and b) a sense of unfair and intolerable harm inflicted by the constructed enemy.
d) The role of fundamentalisms
Fundamentalism is, at least conceptually in its origins, the radical way of professing a religious belief, one that has been assimilated or defined in many periods of history through other terms such as dogmatism, sectarianism or fanaticism.
However, there is also political (or non-religious ideological) fundamentalism in movements that advertise themselves as radical “fundamental” opposition to the current political system.
Fundamentalism, therefore, is a belief (not based on rational conviction but on the acritical acceptance of certain messages), dogmatic (i.e. strictly limited to specific beliefs, as they are formulated by the competent authority), authoritarian (in the sense that it grants absolute power to leaderships that interpret and set the dogma), totalitarian (stating that it is impossible to coexistence with other diverging
−or simply different− positions) and fanatical groups (based on absolute submission required from followers plus absolute rejection of “non-believers”).
All political totalitarianism is based, more or less explicitly, on fundamentalism (religious or ideological).
The benefits that the link between totalitarianism and fundamentalism offer and promise people should not be underrated. The promise of complete security is offered in exchange for total dispossession of freedom. In other words, cancellation of risk through submission and transfer of personal decisions to leader or small group in charge. Fundamentalism is essential in hate narratives.
In conclusion, we see that hate stories are the result of a chain of social phenomena based on fundamentalist ideas and positions that can evolve towards the social construction of defined enemies.
“It is the promise of absolute security in exchange for the total dispossession of freedom”
It could be said, therefore, that hate stories always occur within the general framework of construction of the enemy. At the same time, one factor to consider is that the starting point of the social construction of the enemy is always a feeling of victimisation, with the hated group being blamed for this. This feeling is reproduced and extended within the group that hates. That is why the enemy is hated and feared. The existence (or not) of real elements that make this feeling of victimisation understandable is irrelevant. In many cases, especially for promoters of hate, this victimisation leads to strict and clear victimism.
We also consider that this construction of the enemy is behind all political violence, although construction of the enemy and feelings of hate may be present that do not take behavioural form and are thus not expressed violently. However, they are a necessary precursor of this kind of acts.
It could be said, therefore, that any act of political violence represents the construction of the enemy and the creation of a hate story or narrative. Nevertheless, all constructions of the enemy and/or hate narratives do not necessarily imply political violence.
The paradigmatic example of the culmination of this process (removing the human quality from the ‘other’ and denying the conception of him/her as a fellow human being) occurs when political violence ends up as, or takes the form of, terrorist violence.
It could be said, therefore, that hate stories always occur within the general framework of construction of the enemy. At the same time, one factor to consider is that the starting point of the social construction of the enemy is always a feeling of victimisation, with the hated group being blamed for this. This feeling is reproduced and extended within the group that hates. That is why the enemy is hated and feared. The existence (or not) of real elements that make this feeling of victimisation understandable is irrelevant. In many cases, especially for promoters of hate, this victimisation leads to strict and clear victimism.
We also consider that this construction of the enemy is behind all political violence, although construction of the enemy and feelings of hate may be present that do not take behavioural form and are thus not expressed violently. However, they are a necessary precursor of this kind of acts.
It could be said, therefore, that any act of political violence represents the construction of the enemy and the creation of a hate story or narrative. Nevertheless, all constructions of the enemy and/or hate narratives do not necessarily imply political violence.
The paradigmatic example of the culmination of this process (removing the human quality from the ‘other’ and denying the conception of him/her as a fellow human being) occurs when political violence ends up as, or takes the form of, terrorist violence.
Notes:
La construction del enemígo (In Baca, E and Cabanas, ML (eds) Las victims de la violencia, Madrid. Triacastela 2003). and in: E. Baca, La construction del enemigo y otras formas de alteridad dañada, to be published soon, provide the background for this study.